Using the variation across space, age and sex and the variation across space and sectors, we analyse the relationship between the minimum wage and (un)employment growth in 2015. We use difference-in-differences specifications and instrument the bite of the minimum wage by the lagged bite. The results provide stable evidence that a higher minimum wage bite is related to a higher growth rate of regular employment. We also find stable evidence that a higher minimum wage bite is related to a lower growth rate of marginal employment. These results are consistent with a transformation of marginal to regular jobs. The relationship to total employment is slightly positive in our preferred specification but insignificant or negative in others. For unemployment, we find a positive relationship between the bite of the minimum wage and unemployment growth in our preferred specification but insignificant or negative results in others.
INTRODUCTION
On 1 January 2015, a new statutory minimum wage of €8.50 per hour of work was introduced in Germany. 1 While the minimum wage legislation experienced extensive support from the public, many economists were sceptical and predicted negative effects of the minimum wage on employment (ifo € Okonomenpanel, 2016) . The scepticism may be grounded in standard neoclassical theory where the direction of the effect of a binding minimum wage is unequivocal. However, effects can be ambiguous when labour markets are monopsonistic Manning, 1994, 1999; Garloff, 2010) . Moreover, empirical studies addressing minimum wages often fail to detect negative employment effects (e.g., Card and Krueger, 1994 , Dube, Lester and Reich, 2010 . This theoretical and empirical ambiguity calls for scientific ex-post evaluations of the new German minimum wage (Arni et al., 2014; M€ oller, 2014; Zimmermann, 2014) . We present an ex-post evaluation based on differences across regions further differentiating (a) age groups and sex, and (b) sectors and sex. The minimum wage affects the cells (that are characterized by region, age group and sex) to different degrees and we use a difference-in-differences estimation approach to estimate the relationship between the affectedness and (un)employment growth variables.
For many decades, the empirical literature has discussed potential employment effects of minimum wages. Recently, the literature has converged to a point where most studies find only small employment elasticities (Addison, Blackburn and Cotti, 2015; Dolton, Bondibene and Stops, 2015; Neumark, Salas and Wascher, 2014) . Along with this development, new methods such as the synthetic control method, border discontinuities and interactive fixed effects were applied to minimum wages in the US and mostly fail to detect negative employment effects (Allegretto et al., 2017; Dube, Lester, and Reich, 2010) . As we do in this paper, all these studies use regional variation for identification.
Until 2015, the German experience of minimum wages has been restricted to sector-specific minimum wages. The first sectoral minimum wage was introduced in the construction and roofing sector in 1997. Some other sectoral minimum wages were introduced before 2015 including hairdressing (in 2013) or security services (in 2011) . K€ onig and M€ oller (2009) analyse the introduction effects of the minimum wage in the construction sector by comparing affected workers with unaffected workers of the same sector and find negligible employment effects. Analysing the minimum wage for electricians and painters Frings (2013) does not find negative effects. However, Aretz, Arntz and Gregory (2013) find a considerable negative effect for the employment retention in the roofing sector. The only study that uses regional variation for evaluating sectoral minimum wages is Vom Berge, Frings and Paloyo (2013) , who find negative effects for the minimum wage in the construction sector.
There is now increasing evidence about the employment effect of the new statutory minimum wage in Germany (see e.g. Wittbrodt, 2018, Bonin et al., 2018) . Contributors have used either the variation in the intensity of the minimum wage intervention across regions or the variation across establishments to identify a causal effect of the introduction of the minimum wage. 2 Bossler (2016) , Bossler and Gerner (2016) and Bossler et al. (2018) are using survey data from the IAB establishment panel to measure variation across establishments for their identification. Bossler (2016) uses data from before the minimum wage introduction and shows a modest negative effect on the affected employers' employment expectations. Bossler and Gerner (2016) and Bossler et al. (2018) use the establishment-level affectedness by the minimum wage and show that employment growth was lower because of the minimum wage. In their estimates, total employment (the sum of regular and marginal employment 3 ) growth was 46,000-60,000 individuals below the value that would have been expected without the introduction of the minimum wage.
2. There is not much legal variation in the minimum wage that can be used for evaluation purposes (see Vom Berge et al., 2016c, for an exception) and the comparison between individuals, that are affected by the introduction of the minimum wage and similar individuals that are marginally not affected is prone to measurement error. 3. Marginal employment (sometimes called minijobs) is characterized by monthly earnings below 450 Euro a month. Social security contributions and taxation differs from regular jobs.
A few papers have used the regional intensity of the minimum wage intervention. use bites and Kaitz indices across labour market regions for all employees (i.e. regular and marginal) based on the structure of earnings survey and findin most specificationsthat regular employment was unaffected by the minimum wage, whereas marginal employment decreased, leading to a loss in total employment. Schmitz (2017) estimates the relationship between employment and the bite for full-time employees based on the earnings statistics of the Federal Employment Agency (henceforth BA) by using regional variation (and partly the variation on sex). He finds a negative relationship between the bite in 2013 and regular employment and a large negative relationship to marginal employment. As in the German East-West context, it is likely that the regions with the highest bites are also the least dynamic regions, and Schmitz allows the trends to differ across regions. Using a time interaction to control for these different pre-trends, he finds that the minimum wage has no effect on regular employment, but a large negative effect on marginal employment. Stechert (2018) uses the same distinction on regions, age groups and sex as this paper, and shows with cross-sectional regressions for each month, that regular (marginal) employment of the prime-age age groups shows a positive (negative) relationship with the introduction of the minimum wage. For the youngest cohort (15-24 years), he demonstrates in addition that negative coefficients are also present for regular employment. Finally, Holtem€ oller and Pohle (2017) use the variation over regions and sectors for their identification. As we do, they find positive effects for regular employment.
Other papers provide descriptive evidence. The descriptive governmental monitoring ('Arbeitsmarktspiegel'), which describes individual transitions in the months around the minimum wage introduction, does not detect unusually large inflows into unemployment (Vom Berge et al., 2016a ). However, it shows an increase in the transitions from highly affected marginal employment into regular employment. 4 Updating previous versions of the paper (Garloff, 2015 (Garloff, , 2016 , we contribute to the literature by providing evidence on the relationship between employment and unemployment growth in 2015 and the bite of the minimum wage using both the variation over regions, age groups, and sex and the variation over regions and sectors. Interpreting the minimum wage introduction as a natural experiment to appropriately defined units, we construct a panel of cells and estimate difference-in-differences specifications. The coefficient of interest is estimated by comparing the change of (un)employment growth in cells, which were heavily affected by the introduction of the minimum wage with the change in cells that were not strongly affected by the introduction of the minimum wage. As our bite measure relates to 31.12.2014, the estimate might suffer from anticipation and we thus instrument the bite in 2014 with the bite in 2012.
The estimated coefficient of interest is the average change in (un)employment growth that is partially correlated with the bite of the minimum wage after its 4. Note that such a transition can be of a pure technical nature in the sense that a person that earned 450 Euro before the introduction of the minimum wage and whose earnings increased to more than 450 Euros would be automatically counted as regularly instead of marginally employed.
introduction. It can only be interpreted causally if in the absence of the minimum wage (conditional on the covariates), the (un)employment growth across cells with different minimum wage treatment intensities would have developed similarly (parallel trends assumption) and if there are no serious spillover effects (SUTVA assumption) . Parallel trends cannot be tested, but by looking at pretrends (see Figures A1-A4 in Appendix S1), the monthly time structure of the minimum wage effects, placebo treatments and by performing various robustness checks, we provide evidence that, apart from some anticipation, the parallel trends assumption is likely to be not seriously violated for regular and marginal employment. Concerning spillover effects, Fitzenberger and Doerr (2016) have noted that they may constitute a problem in the evaluation of the general minimum wage. Below, we discuss possible spillover effect and conclude that we do not think that they cause major problems for our estimation approach, because they are either unlikely to arise in a short time horizon or unlikely to have a large influence on the estimates. And thus, we conclude that our results are likely due to a causal connection between the minimum wage and the employment variables, at least for regular and marginal employment. Compared with the literature, in our empirical set-up, we use the same regional variation that , Schmitz, 2017 and Bonin et al. (2018 rely on, but use in addition the variation over individual characteristics age and sex. 5 Doing this, we use a classical distinction from the labour demand literature that shows that different types of labour inputs, as characterized by age and sex, are only imperfectly substitutable (Card and Lemieux, 2001; Fitzenberger and Kohn, 2006; Glitz and Wissmann, 2017) . This has the advantage that we can analyse heterogeneous effects for different age groups and for men and women and that we can use more variation for identification. It comes at the cost, however, that we cannot base our estimation equation directly on Card's (1992) model, which is a regional model and not a model on regions and individual characteristics. Whether or not parallel trends are more likely in the former or the latter case is not clear a priori as there are both heterogeneous regional trends and heterogeneous trends across age groups and sex. This is particularly true as we use one difference more than the literature. We must establish a parallelism of trends with respect to employment growth rather than employment. This comes at the cost that we can only use the year 2015 for estimating the effect of the minimum wage. One disadvantage of our paper as compared to the paper of is that they dispose over a bite measure for all employees (which we cannot use), whereas our bite measure is based on full-time employed regular employees only and thus more subject to measurement error. Finally, a difference to the former cited papers is that we use an IV strategy to guarantee that there is no anticipation in the bite. This is not done by any of the other papers.
In most specifications, we find evidence that the minimum wage negatively affected marginal employment and positively affected regular employment. Some evidence points to the fact that the minimum wage transformed some marginal 5. An additional difference to the paper of is that they use all marginally employed individuals (including second job holders and short-term employed), whereas we use only exclusively marginally employed without second job and short-term employed. We prefer this variant as we want to avoid double counting of individuals. jobs into regular jobs. We find few evidence for a negative relationship between the bite and total employment. We find some weak evidence that unemployment increased due to the introduction of the minimum wage, possibly because participation increased in reaction to the minimum wage. The changes in employment implied by the coefficients of Table 2 (panel B) and the minimum wage increase from 0 to 0.0746 are a decrease of marginal employment of around 42,000, an increase of regular employment of around 119,000 and an increase of total employment of around 11,000 heads. Taking into account the fact that we do not have a separate bite measure for marginal employment, we can also use the estimates for regular and total employment to deduce the implied employment change for marginal employment. This would be À108.000 and thus considerably larger than our estimated À42.000 in absolute terms. The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the economic background of the minimum wage introduction, which is the decreasing collective bargaining coverage and the rising wage inequality. Section 3 derives the econometric approach of our analysis. Section 4 describes the publicly available data source. Section 5 presents the estimation results including effects on employment and unemployment and, finally, Section 6 concludes.
THE GERMAN STATUTORY MINIMUM WAGE
The introduction of the minimum wage was a part of the coalition agreement in December 2013 of the Grand coalition (social democrats, SPD, and conservatives, CDU/CSU) in Germany. To this date, sectoral minimum wage regulations covered only a minority of employees. Up to 1996, there were no minimum wages in Germany. Starting in 1996, sectoral minimum wages were introduced first in the construction sector as a prolongation of collective bargaining outcomes. Other sectors followed.
In mid-2014, the minimum wage law ('Tarifautonomiest€ arkungsgesetz') passed the two chambers of the Parliament and became effective as of August 2014. It contained the introduction of a minimum wage of €8.50 from 1 January 2015, plus extended possibilities for sectoral minimum wages. There are few exemptions of the minimum wage: it does not apply to those under 18 years of age, to individuals in vocational training, to interns during short internships, to the former long-term unemployed in the first 6 months of new employment and to individuals who work in sectors where a binding minimum wage under 8.50 Euro exists and newspaper carriers.
The traditional and most important wage setting institution in Germany is collective bargaining. In the process of collective bargaining employer associations representing their member firms bargain with a union (sometimes with several union), representing the employees of the firms, over wages and other working conditions, where collective bargaining is mostly characterized by a sectoral and a regional dimension. These agreements are typically for one to two years. Then, the process restarts. In general, the collective bargaining agreements are extended to all employees of the firms, not only union members. Since 1996, there exists a possibility to extend these negotiated working conditions from the collective bargaining agreement to all firms and employees within the sector and A. Garloff region. By the end of 2014, around 4 million or under 12% of total employment is covered by extended collective agreements.
In the empirical literature, collective bargaining is often attributed economically relevant effects on outcomes such as wages (Addison, Teixeira, Evers and Bellmann, 2014) , productivity (H€ ubler and Jirjahn, 2003) and labour turnover (Pfeifer, 2011) . While collective bargaining has a long tradition, recent data illustrate a decreasing coverage ( Figure 1 ). The fraction of employees covered by collective bargaining has decreased steadily since the late 1990s. Moreover, panel B Minimum wage and (un-)employment in Germany of Figure 1 shows that collective bargaining coverage is at a lower level in the East than in the West, but the decreasing pattern evolves very similarly. This falling employee-level coverage is mostly driven by a lower fraction of firms participating in their respective employer associations' bargaining. As firms that are not participating in collective bargaining agreements typically pay lower wages than firms that do participate (Fitzenberger, Kohn and Lembcke, 2013) , a decreasing coverage likely leads to lower average wages and might also lead to problems at the very bottom of the wage distribution, wages that are typically looked after by unions in the wage negotiations. Thus, a decreasing importance of collective bargaining may provide reasons to introduce minimum wages.
Other developments advancing the introduction of the minimum wage were the stagnating real wage development and the increasing wage inequality. Figure 2 illustrates that the real median wage remained stagnant since the early 1990, and the 20th percentile of the real wage distribution even started to fall within the same time span. Together these developments cause an increase in wage inequality, particularly in the lower tail of the wage distribution depicted by the dotted line. (see Burda and Seele, 2016 , Card, Heining and Kline, 2013 , Dustmann, Ludsteck and Sch€ onberg, 2009 , Fitzenberger, 2012 , Kohn, 2006 , M€ oller, 2008 . More recently, M€ oller (2016) shows that there is no more increase in wage inequality after 2010 and for some groups even a decline of wage inequality until 2014.
Minimum wages are a potential policy tool to tackle wage inequality and to foster wage growth along the lower tail of the wage distribution (Gregory, 2014) . The impact on wages and a modest effect on wage inequality are mostly approved in the economic literature (e.g. Dickens and Manning, 2004) . However, employment effectsas side effectsare much more uncertain and the focus of the following sections.
Theoretically, in competitive labour markets binding minimum wages would give rise to decreasing employment and to increasing unemployment. In a production function framework, given that there is diminishing marginal productivity in the use of the affected individuals, the employment decreases generally by less than the number of affected. If marginal productivity was constant, employment would decrease by the number of persons affected through the minimum wage. With increasing marginal productivity, the employment loss could even be larger. When there are other production factors that are not affected by the minimum wage (e.g. high-skilled individuals), they could profit from the employment loss of the affected factor, and when they are substitutes in production, they could also lose when they are complements. When employment decreases, unemployment typically increases. However, the effect of the minimum wage on unemployment generally also depends on participation. The effect on unemployment could be more pronounced, when participation increases due to the increased wage expectation. If labour markets are not competitive, for example because there are search or matching frictions, effects on employment and unemployment can be anything: negative, zero or positive (Garloff, 2010) . 6
ESTIMATION METHOD AND IDENTIFICATION
In the empirical part of the paper, we explain the employment development DL ijkt , which is the growth rate of employment in region i, age group j and sex k relative to previous year's employment in the same month, i.e. DL ijkt ¼ L ijkt ÀL ijktÀ1 L ijktÀ1 . 7 Using the regional variation to identify the effect of a minimum wage has been proposed by Card (1992) . Card develops a very simple structural model that gives rise to a regression of the change of regional employment on the bite. We change and develop their model in the following way.
Card proposes the following model
In the basic Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, due to monopsony power caused by search frictions, all wages are below marginal productivity. The effect of a binding minimum wage on employment and unemployment is zero as long as the minimum wage lies below the highest wage that is paid prior to the introduction of the minimum wage. If the minimum wage exceeds marginal productivity the employment loss is total. In the model of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), generally a binding minimum wage will destroy jobs as some (low quality) matches become unprofitable. Finally, an extension of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model with heterogeneous search costs and reservation wages demonstrates that employment increases and unemployment decreases with an increasing minimum wage, since more matches are formed when employers and employees meet, as wage offers lie above the reservation wage more often (see Garloff 2010 ). 7. We use different employment variables: regular employment, marginal employment and total employment. Unless stated otherwise, regular employment contains both full-time and part-time employment.
where Dw is the wage change between 2014 and 2015, DL is the employment change in this time interval, B is the bite (share of persons affected) just before the introduction of the minimum wage (31.12.2014), X are characteristics, e and r are error terms and the rest parameters. All variables refer to region i. By plug-
Now, we further develop Cards model to include not only regional variation, but also the variation over age groups and sex (sectors in an alternative model).
In addition, we introduce a time dimension in Cards model by observing the variables not only for the year as a whole, but with monthly observations, which allows us to introduce fixed effects and month dummies. Due to the inclusion of fixed effects, time-invariant X's are omitted from the estimated equation. Finally, we extend the time series backwards beyond 2014 and include an interaction term between the bite and the year 2015 to allow a differences in differences (of a difference, i.e. a differences in differences in differences specification) interpretation.
The resulting equation then is:
The subscript ijk represents the units of observation, which are labour market regionsage groupsex cells in our baseline sample. However, we also test the variation over regions and sectors and use different aggregations in our robustness checks (see below). Subscript t represents monthly time observations, which characterize our panel structure. B ijk is the measure for the bite, i.e. the share of persons whose wage is below the minimum wage just before the introduction of the minimum wage (31.12.2014). The parameter of interest in this specification is a, the relationship between the bite after the introduction of the minimum wage (D MW t ¼ 1) and employment growth. The parameter is identified over the time variation because the bite (in 2014) is constant over time. Clearly, b 1 is not identified in equation (1) as we include fixed effects and B ijk does not vary over time. 8 b 2 describes whether average employment growth was different in 2015, conditional on the other covariates, particularly the bite. c t captures aggregate time specific effects for each month (D month t ¼ 1) in the analysis sample. The specification further controls for a unit fixed effect h ijk , i.e. the specification allows for a cell-specific linear employment trend over the time period. e ijkt is assumed to satisfy strict exogeneity in the sense of Wooldridge's (2002) equation (10.12) (p.253). That is, the conditional expectation of the error term for all t conditional on all explanatory variables, including the fixed effects, is zero.
In the context of the DiD set-up, the conditional independence assumption is made plausible by looking at the parallel trends assumption and by discussing spillover effects. A causal interpretation of the DiD coefficient hinges critically 8. It would be nice if the parameter was identified, because we could use the parameter estimate to check whether the bite in 2014 was correlated with employment growth prior to 2015 (expected zero).
on the question whether conditional on the covariates the cells, that were treated with different minimum wage intensities (as measured by the bite), would have developed similarly in the absence of the minimum wage. If pre-trends are reasonably similar for differently affected cells, the parallel trends assumption may hold. Figure A1 -A4 in Appendix S1 demonstrates the pre-trends for three bite tertiles. They seem reasonably close in 2013 for the employment variables.
In 2014 for marginal employment (F1), one might suspect a stronger downward trend for the group with the highest bite already in 2014. Similarly, in the picture for regular employment (F2), the growth rate for the group with the highest bite seems to develop differently already in the second half of 2014. Together with robustness checks (inclusion of cell-specific trends, similar results when leaving out the highest tertile, Placebo tests), we conclude that a causal interpretation of the results for marginal and regular employment is probably not spoiled by in-parallel trends. However, anticipation may cause that we underestimate the actual effects of the minimum wage, but will leave the signs unchanged (unless anticipation exceeds the actual effect).
Concerning spillover effects that may cause violations of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), Fitzenberger and Doerr (2016) distinguish three kinds that may cause problems in the evaluation of a minimum wage. First, spillover may arise if wages above the minimum wage react to the introduction of the minimum wage (e.g. due to fairness considerations). Though in our setting, this would mean that the bite of the minimum wage underestimates the effect of the minimum wage on wages, and the effect on the estimated parameter may be small, as this will probably not affect the ranking of the cells. 9 Second, substitution effects may be present: an expensive worker (through the introduction of the minimum wage) may be substituted for a cheaper one (relative to productivity): production (e.g. in large firms with establishments in different region) may be moved from high-bite and low-productivity regions to low-bite and high-productivity regions. This is of course possible but is not likely to happen in the short time frame we look at (until the end of 2015) and for most industries shifts of production will be costly and be only performed if no other strategies are available. Third, scale effects may play a role. If the production is scaled down due to the introduction of the minimum wage, employment in groups that are not directly affected by the minimum wage decreases. As long as these scale effects take place within a cell, our estimation approach will correctly catch these effects. If they happen also across cells, we do not think that this systematically affects our estimates. Finally, when using regional data, regional mobility may be a problem. One aspect of mobility is the mobility of firms, which we discuss above. Another aspect is the mobility of workers. If for some reason, workers move away from (or to) high-bite regions, the estimates for (un)employment may be affected. However, we do not perceive such mobility effects very likely, since we do not see good reasons for this to happen. Taken together in our view, spillover effects are either small or not present in the short run. Thus, we do not think that they may invalidate our conclusions. 9. In the most simple variant, the spillover on wages will be constant (not depend on the bite) across cells and would thus leave the estimated parameters unchanged.
Minimum wage and (un-)employment in Germany
Since the bite (measured 31.12.2014) could already be spoiled by anticipation (if, e.g., wages were adjusted in 2014), we also estimate equation (1) using a 2 SLS setting. More precisely, we instrument the bite in 2014 by its counterpart in 2012 to account for anticipation. The idea is that the bite in 2012 measures something very similar than the bite in 2014, but anticipation in 2012 is not present. Thus, we expect a high correlation between the instrument and the bite, and we expect that there is no direct influence of the instrument on the outcome variable other than via the correlation with the bite.
In a second step, we slightly change the specification and allow for flexible interactions between the bite and time for each month before and after the minimum wage introduction. Thus, for every month we allow the bite to have a separate relationship with employment growth:
a t captures the relationship between the bite and employment growth in each month included in the sample (we display below the 6 months preceding and following the introduction of the minimum wage). After the minimum wage introduction, this allows for effect differences in each month, which is January to June 2015. Additionally, it allows for anticipation effects in the months before the introduction of the minimum wage. Alternatively, if there was no anticipation, it allows for checking whether the bite measure really measures the impact of the minimum wage, or whether there are other unobserved factors causing particular cells to grow at a different pace than others. An underlying assumption of our approach is the homogeneity of the treatment effect across cells, which we use as observations. As we use labour market region-age group-sex cells, we compare male cells with female cells. Moreover, we compare different age groups, for example the age group 15-24 years with the group 55-64. We also compare labour market regions across Germany. If the cell effects are not homogenous, i.e. if males and females, or individuals of different age groups face different effects from the minimum wage, our results can be biased. The same is true if the relationship is not linear. In our robustness checks, we test for differences and estimate separate relationships by gender and age groups.
As we use differences and not levels as dependent variable, the approach is of use only for the first year after the introduction of the minimum wage. This clearly means that our only interest is the estimation of short-term effects of the minimum wage. A consequence of our approach of using monthly observations and 12 months differences is that the autocorrelation of the observations is high. To account for this, we also estimate a dynamic version of the panel (see below).
DATA
We use data of the statistical office of the BA. The BA publishes official employment and unemployment statistics for each month. These data are available on customized levels of aggregation. From this data source, we hold a monthly data panel of workers of age between 15 and 64. The data are disaggregated by sex, A. Garloff five age groups (15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64) and 141 labour market regions. The labour market regions can be constructed sharply from districts ('Kreise') in Germany and are defined by commuting so that labour market regions show little overlap in terms of flows of employees (Kosfeld and Werner, 2012) .
In total, the disaggregation leads to a data panel with 5 9 2 9 141 = 1410 data cells which are our units of analysis. The panel in differences covers the 36 months from January 2013 to December 2015.
In the robustness checks, we present results from other levels of disaggregation. First, we use data for districts instead of labour market regions, again disaggregated by sex and age groups. Second, we use the employment projections 10 of the BA, which cannot be disaggregated into age and sex but can be disaggregated by region ('Bundesl€ ander')-industry cells comprising all states and 20 different industries. We also present results for the regions without further distinguishing by age groups, sex or sector. Finally, we also present results for labour market region, sector and sex cells.
The major outcome variable of interest is the employment growth in each unit of observation. We look at regular employment, which is subject to social security contributions, and (exclusive) marginal employment, which is not subject to (full) social insurance contributions. 11 We also consider total employment, the sum of both. In the period of analysis, marginal employment is legally defined by an employment contract that pays no more that € 450 a month.
Our second outcome variable is regional unemployment growth. We dispose over unemployment data disaggregated by region and sex, so the unemployment regressions are based on 282 cells only and thus match the regressions for employment growth that use the regional variation, only. In a robustness check, we use regional unemployment data that are further disaggregated by five years of age groups (30-54 years) as well as unemployment rates for this disaggregation.
We construct a measure for the bite of the minimum wage from the remuneration statistic ('Entgeltstatistik') of 31 December 2014 provided by the Federal Employment Agency. More precisely, for each cell of interest (region; region 9 sex; region 9 age 9 sex; region 9 sector; region 9 sector 9 sex) we calculate the share of full-time employed individuals whose monthly wages are below 1,450€ (1,400€/1,500€ for robustness). We do this since there is no information on hours worked in the data. In this respect, we share the difficulties of other studies addressing the effects of the sectoral minimum wages in Germany . Thus, our bite measure measures the 10. Employment projections (2 months values or 3 months values) are a variant of the employment statistic (6 months values) of the BA. They are called projections as a small part of the new jobs do appear with some delay in the register data and this delay is corrected for. In Table 5 , column (1) I use 3 months values (values that are available after 3 months) of the employment projections for the regression. 11. For a robustness check, we also consider total marginal employment that consists of exclusive marginal employment (about two-thirds of all marginal employment) and marginal employment of secondary job holders (one third). The results are generally similar but smaller in magnitude than for exclusively marginally employed individuals.
Minimum wage and (un-)employment in Germany approximate bite for full-time employees only. 12 1,450€ corresponds to between 39 and 40 hours of work per week, 1,500€ to slightly less than 41 hours (1,400€ to 38 hours). This is probably the range into which full-time employment falls for most full-time employees. 13 show that bite measures using full-time employed persons only and bite measures using all employees are highly correlated, thus justifying our approach. If on the left-hand side we use measures other than full-time employment, the bite measure is hard to justify. Its use can nevertheless be justified if the bite measures for the different groups considered are highly correlated across cells as suggested by . In this case, we can interpret the results, keeping in mind that an (uncorrelated) measurement error in the independent variable leads to a bias towards zero (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 73f.) . Another issue is anticipation. When using the bite in 2014, it might be the case that the wage distribution contains already changes due to an anticipation of the minimum wage. As a robustness check, we use the bite in 2013 to circumvent such anticipation effects, which are more unlikely in 2013, whereas anticipation is likely to exist for the 4th quarter of 2014 (see Kubis, Rebien and Weber, 2015) . present evidence based on SOEP data that there is no such anticipation in April 2014 which also justifies our strategy to partly using December 2013 as a bite measure. In addition, in the main equations, we instrument the bite in 2014 by the bite in 2012.
A description of the baseline analysis sample is presented in Table 1 , which displays averages by bite of the minimum wage for total employment, regular employment, marginal employment and unemployment in levels and growth rates. We observe that labour market region-age group-sex cells are smaller when the bite is above the median, and they have a less dynamic total employment growth on average. 14 The same patterns for employment levels and growth hold true for regular employment. However, the number of marginal employees is significantly larger in cells for which we calculated a bite above the median. This corresponds with the notion that marginal employees are more severely affected. The (weighted) average bite of the minimum wage is 7.46%, and it is 17.30% for 12. Further measurement errors might stem from minimum wage exemptions. Individuals in vocational training and individuals under 18 years are excluded from our data. More problematic is the exemption of individuals whose extended collective bargaining agreement is below € 8.50. However, not many sectors have undercut the minimum wage: in April 2015, there were around 230.000 employees in sectors/jobs and regions where sectoral minimum wages were allowed to be below 8.50 Euro (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017). In addition, these wages generally are only slightly below the minimum wage. We also cannot control for the exemption for long-term unemployed in the first 6 months of new employment. But it seems that this exemption has not been applied very often. (see Vom Berge et al. 2016c) This might be because the access to this exemption is restricted to a sub group of the around 1 million long-term unemployed, namely those who did not have any interruption of their unemployment spell in the last year. 13. The federal statistical office reports for 2015 an effective working time of 40.5 hours for fulltime employed individuals. It also reports that the working time for full-time employed is relatively stable and has been slightly increasing by 0.5 hours between 1996 and 2015. (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016) 14. The cells with an above median bite are smaller, because the small female, young and East-German cells are disproportionately affected by the introduction of the minimum wage.
units above the median and only 4.64% below the median, indicating that there is considerable variation in the bite in the data. 15
RESULTS

Main regression results
We display the baseline regression results for the variable employment growth in Table 2 (columns (1)- (3)). 16 Panel A shows the relationship between the bite and employment growth, estimated as described by equation (1). In panel B, in addition, we instrument the bite with the hypothetical bite in 2012. 17 The coefficient on total employment growth is small and insignificant in panel A and small and significantly positive in panel B. The estimates on the development of regular (15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64) in labour market regions, 01/2013-12/2015, dependent variable is the growth rate of employment; column (4): observations are labour market region-gender cells, dependent variable is the growth rate of unemployed individuals; standard errors are robust. Bite is the share of full-time employed individuals earning less than 1,450 Euros in 2014. The share of individuals that earn below 1450 in 2012 instruments the bite in panels B and C. Panel C is estimated using all admissible monthly time interactions on the bite. Marginal employment and total employment do not contain 'ausschließlich kurzfristige Besch€ aftigung' (short-term employment) or minijobs of secondary earners ('geringf€ ugige Besch€ aftigung im Nebenerwerb'). Data source: BA employment statistic, BA unemployment statistics and BA earnings statistics employment in panel A and B show a significant positive relationship between the growth of regular employment and the bite of the minimum wage. Although theoretically possible, this is a surprising sign result. At the same time as expected, there is a significant negative relationship between the bite of the minimum wage and the growth of marginal employment. Panel C displays the relationship for each month before and after the minimum wage introduction (from July 2014 to June 2015). This allows an assessment of when such effects occurred. While there is some room for anticipatory adjustments, a relationship, which is due to the minimum wage, should be observed in all months after December 2014 (until 12/2015) . Column (1) shows that there is some variation in total employment over the months of observation, which is also correlated with the bite. However, we do not observe any clear pattern indicating a minimum wage effect on overall employment growth.
As far as the two other employment outcomes are concerned, we observe an increase of regular employment and a drop in marginal employment with the introduction of the minimum wage (in January 2015). For regular employment, the coefficients are positive and significant starting in September, shortly after the minimum wage law became effective. This could be due to anticipation. In January, the size of the coefficient almost doubles as compared to December. This is the pattern, which we expect from the introduction of the minimum wage. For marginal employment, the coefficients are significant starting in November 2014, which we would interpret as stemming from anticipation. The coefficients are as well much higher in 2015 than in November and December 2014.
We conclude that from the relationship between the bite of the minimum wage and employment growth, there is not much evidence in favour of negative effects of the minimum wage on total employment. Instead, our interpretation of the findings, which is also confirmed by a dataset that has been assembled for purpose of tracing changes through the minimum wage (Vom Berge et al., 2016a , is that the minimum wage created regular employment at the expense of marginal employment. 18 To substantiate this claim, we further analyse the relationship between regular employment growth, the growth rate of marginal employment and the bite of the minimum wage: we run the regression from Table 2 for regular employment by including the growth rate of marginal employment as explanatory variable, interacting it also with the minimum wage introduction Dummy. Table 3 shows that the signs are as we expect: whereas in normal times regular employment and marginal employment move in the same direction, after 2015 the relationship between marginal employment growth and regular employment growth was significantly negative. In addition, the size of the coefficient on the bite is somewhat reduced by including the growth rate of marginal employment. This 18. Note that a transformation of minijobs to regular employment does not necessarily imply an increase in working hours. The transformation can be purely technical when the wage increase (caused by the minimum wage) lifts the employee over the 450 Euro threshold. Also, note that it is possible (and even likely) that in case of such a technical transformation the individuals earns less than before, as with 451 Euro the social security contributions paid for by the employee jump from zero to around 10%. Note that in addition, from 451 Euros the full amount is subject to income tax.
suggests that the decrease in marginal employment 'explains' a part of the increase in regular employment. However, the coefficient on the bite remains significantly positive. Thus, the transformation, according to this result, is only part of the story. 19
Heterogeneity of the results
As a check for heterogeneities, we estimate the relationships separately for age groups and for men and women (Table 4 ). As the bite of the minimum wage is significantly larger for young age groups, one might expect potentially larger negative employment effects for the young age groups. In addition, Stechert (2018) shows that the youngest age group was hit hardest by the minimum wage. Our results show that the age groups 25-34 and 55-64 show the worst development in total employment. For the young age group, the relationship is negative for all employment variables, whereas the old age group has a large negative coefficient for marginal employment and a small positive coefficient for regular employment. For regular employment, the age group 25-34 is the only age group with a (significant) negative coefficient. The results also suggest that minijobs were affected strongly in the oldest age group. For the youngest age group, we do not find significant results for total employment or marginal employment, and we find a small positive coefficient for regular employment. The fact that Stechert (2018) shows different effects for this age group might stem from the fact that we are able to exclude apprentices and individuals below 18 years (two groups with minimum wage exceptions) from our analysis and that we include fixed effects. 19. It is also to be noted that the regression is not ideal in the sense that a transformation does not necessarily take place within one month. More realistically, the transformation will take place in subsequent months. However, using lags in the regression would lead to a dynamic panel structure and the results would not be directly comparable across the models any more.
When we separate the relationship by sex, we find positive coefficients on total employment, which are significant and relatively larger when compared to Table 2 . Moreover, we observe strong negative partial correlations with marginal employment while the relationship with regular employment is positively significant. The coefficients for men are somewhat larger than the coefficients for women.
Results for regional unemployment
Next, we estimate equation (1), replacing DL ijkt by DU ikt , the growth rate of unemployment for each labour market region and for men and women. Again, we use the fraction of affected full-time workers as the measure of the bite in the respective unit of observation. 20 20. Doing this, we have similar measurement problems as above.
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We display the results for the development of unemployment in Table 2 , column (4) . Panel A (FE) and B (FE-IV) show a significant positive relationship between the bite of the minimum wage in 2015 and the growth rate of unemployment in the months after the minimum wage was introduced. Panel C displays separate effects for the month before and after the minimum wage introduction. Although all time interactions are significantly positive, they do not show a clear time structure of the relationship between the bite of the minimum wage and unemployment that is related to the introduction of the minimum wage. The coefficients in the first months of 2015 do not seem to be larger than the coefficients in the last months of 2014. Because the relationship between our bite measure and unemployment growth is not as strongly related to the time of the introduction of the minimum wage as employment growth, one should be careful in interpreting it. Taken together, our view is that the displayed coefficients provide weak evidence for the view that the minimum wage has led to a higher unemployment growth. 21 However, at this stage this should be interpreted very carefully. The Placebo tests (Table A2 , column (4)) show that the coefficient on the bite (which should be zero, ideally) is even larger in this case, implying that the bite measure in this framework is not ideal to measure the actual effect of the minimum wage on unemployment. Or, put differently, parallel trends may not be the case for our observation units (see also Figure A4 in Appendix S1). This also points to a very cautious interpretation of the coefficients in panels A and B of Table 2 , column (4).
Robustness results for employment and unemployment
We dispose also over data for regular employment for industry-state (Bun-desl€ ander or NUTS 1 regions) cells as well as for industry-labour market regionsex cells. Unfortunately, we do not dispose over the time series of marginal employment for these disaggregation. The results for the state level data (using however the bite in 2013 instead of 2014, which we do not have) are similar. The interaction term of equation (1) estimated for industry-state cells rather than for labour market region-age group-sex cells and for the period from June 2014 up to December 2015 is 0.040*** (see Table 5 , column (1)), i.e. a bit smaller than the 0.060*** from Table 2 (column (2), panel A). If we use the slightly different industry classification on the district level and additionally stratify by sex, we obtain somewhat larger and significant estimates for the bite in 2015 for both specifications (see Table 5 , columns (2) and (3)). Thus, based on industry cells, we conclude that there is a positive relationship between the bite of the minimum wage and the growth of regular employment.
We also test other dimensions of aggregation to check the stability of our results. For example, we estimate Table 2 also for districts instead of labour market regions. Including the size of the coefficients, the results are very similar (see Table A1 in Appendix S1). 21. Note that observing, at the same time, both a higher unemployment growth and a higher employment growth due to the minimum wage does not contradict each other. Movements in and out of inactivity are an important part of the movements on the labour market. It is possible and not unlikely that a higher wage expectation caused by the minimum wage increased the incentives for some previously inactive people to register as unemployed.
We also run Placebo-type regressions. That is, we delete the information for 2015 from the sample and run the regression by arbitrarily assigning the treatment to the months July 2013-October 2014. We expect the interaction term to be close to zero for this treatment assignment because there is no treatment at the time considered. Table A2 in Appendix S1 displays the results for the months July 2013 and January 2014. They demonstrate the general picture that the Placebo tests yield small and/or insignificant coefficients. Starting in May 2014, the coefficients for all employment variables are significant, small and increasing (in absolute value) over time with the same signs as in the non-placebo regressions. Anticipation may very well be the reason for this. For the rest of the period considered, five out of ten coefficients are significant for regular employment, seven out of ten for marginal employment and three out of ten for total employment. 22 We also use a (shorter) time series for regular employment differentiated by working time. We can split regular employment into three categories: full-time, part-time and unknown. Unfortunately, this time series has a structural break: in September 2014, the number of individuals with unknown working time drops from about 350,000 to about 80,000 because of changes in the reporting process. Unfortunately, those with unknown working time predominantly work in establishments that pay low wages so that the structural break and the bite of the minimum wage are related. If we do not correct for this structural break, a part of the structural break is in the estimates for the minimum wage coefficient that grow large for both full-time and part-time. 23 To account for the structural break, we add two terms to equation (1): a dummy variable which equals 1 after August (2) and (3)).
22. 0.027 is the largest value that occurs in the pre-anticipation period. If significant, the coefficient is always positive for regular employment and total employment, whereas for marginal employment, the coefficient is positive in the pre-anticipation period and negative from May 2014. 23. The coefficients for equation (1) are 0.081*** for full-time employment and 0.598*** for parttime employment without correction.
2014 and a term for the interaction between the bite and this dummy. The estimates for full-time and part-time yield 0.015** and 0.132***, respectively. 24 As above, we interpret this as a transformation of marginal employment to regular employment, where this transformation takes place mostly in part-time. It is reassuring that we receive positive and significant result also for full-time employees, because this is where our bite measure is supposed to be the best fit to the left-hand side variable and it is also reassuring that the coefficient is relatively small for full-time employees.
In a further robustness check, we cast our panel regression in a dynamic framework. This makes sense with monthly growth rates because they largely overlap. For the Difference GMM and for the System GMM estimators, we get consistently positive significant results for regular employment (magnitude of the short-term relationship 0.01 to 0.02), negative significant results for marginal employment (magnitude À0.03 to À0.06) and a positive, but mostly insignificant coefficient for total employment. Not all specification tests for the dynamic panel setting have been successful. We often fail the overidentifying restrictions tests. Thus, we must read these results with caution and we only use them to assess whether they contradict our main results.
As further robustness checks, we exclude the tertile of cells that is most heavily affected by the introduction of the minimum wage, and we include linear cell-specific time trends as further controls in the main equation. None of these changes alters our main results of positive (negative) effects on regular (marginal) employment (Table A4 in Appendix S1).
We also run robustness checks for the results on unemployment. We dispose over a time series on unemployment and unemployment rates, disaggregated by 5 years of age groups (for prime-age individuals, 30-54 years). When we perform the baseline regression (fixed effects) for these two variables, we do find large and significantly positive results for both (Table A3 in Appendix S1). 25
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyse the relationship between the minimum wage and employment and unemployment based on different disaggregation of administrative data in 2015. For regular employment, and particularly for full-time employment, we provide a reasonable approximate measure of the bite. The results confirm a positive relationship between the bite of the minimum wage and growth of regular employment both for cells that are defined by region, age, and sex and no negative relationship for cells that are defined by region and sector (and sex). This implies that cells that were heavily affected by the minimum wage introduction have been growing faster (not slower) after the minimum wage introduction. The development of minijobs is significantly negatively related to the bite, and the coefficients are somewhat larger than for regular 24. Note that these results are based on the shorter time series until April 2015. We do not dispose over data until December for the working time categories. 25. We have to use the share earning below 1400 instead of 1450 Euros and cannot perform IV regressions in this case, since we do not dispose for bites in 2012 for this disaggregation. employment across all data and specifications. It is possible that the positive relationship between bite and regular employment growth with the age-specific data is due to a transformation of minijobs to regular jobs. Another possibility is that there is a labour supply effect 26 that is related to the bite measure. 27 A third possibility is that the growing regular employment is due to the fact that black market work has been turned into regular employment. This might be because with the introduction of the minimum wage, controls of working time, etc., have been intensified.
If we consider the sum of regular and marginal employment (total employment), in our preferred (FE-IV) specification, we detect a small positive significant relationship between the bite measure and employment growth (coefficient: 0.004; magnitude: +11,000 employees). However, we do not have a strong case for a positive relationship between the bite and total employment, since the results are not as stable as for regular and marginal employment; and in any case, if it is present it is likely to be small. Unemployment growth has been faster in cells that were strongly affected as compared to cells that were not strongly affected. Similar to the results for employment that are based on the spatial variation only, the results for unemployment also might be driven by a regional dynamics that is related to but not caused by the minimum wage. In addition, the stability of the result is not as convincing as in the case of regular and marginal employment. If in fact unemployment has been increasing due to the introduction of the minimum wage, this would not necessarily imply that there was also a negative employment effect as the change in unemployment can also stem from changes in participation, which are also plausible with the introduction of the minimum wage.
An open question is that even if, so far, there is no effect on total employment, whether negative side effects of the minimum wage show up later, for example in the next recession. Also, it might be the case that there are some groups in the labour market that are negatively affected (e.g. the low-skilled) but that we fail to detect this effect since it is offset by labour supply effects for other groups (e.g. migrants). scientific staff of the minimum wage commission, the participants of the 6th IFO Dresden workshop on Labour Economics and Social Policy and the participants of the Workshop 'Minimum Wages. Old and New Issues' at France Strat egie in Paris as well as two anonymous referees and the editor for helpful comments and discussions. Occasionally, I refer to previous versions of the paper (Garloff, 2015 (Garloff, , 2016 . In Garloff (2015) I performed a similar analysis using data on Bundesl€ ander and sectors, in Garloff (2016) , I use region-sex-age cells for five years of age groups for prime-agers (30-54 years).
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